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Abstract
Large-scale computing systems today are assembled by numerous computing
units for massive computational capability needed to solve problems at scale,
which enables failures common events in supercomputing scenarios. Consider-
ing the demanding resilience requirements of supercomputers today, we present
a quantitative study on fine-grained failure modeling for contemporary and fu-
ture large-scale computing systems. We integrate various types of failures from
different system hierarchical levels and system components, and summarize the
overall system failure rates formally. Given that nowadays system-wise failure
rate needs to be capped under a threshold value for reliability and cost-efficiency
purposes, we quantitatively discuss different scenarios of system resilience, and
analyze the impacts of resilience to different error types on the variation of sys-
tem failure rates, and the correlation of hierarchical failure rates. Moreover, we
formalize and showcase the resilience efficiency of failure-bounded supercomput-
ers today.
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1. Introduction
Due to the demanding need of High Performance Computing (HPC) and
the fast-advancing HPC technology, large-scale computing systems today are
assembled by a large amount of computing units equipped with supporting
components for an extremely computational and reliable HPC eco-system. Var-
ious studies showcase that failures are not rare events in such HPC systems due
to the numerous interconnected components. Regardless of the fact that the
growing number of components in HPC systems aggregate failure rates overall,
root causes of failures in supercomputers include radiation-induced effects such
as particle strikes from cosmic radiation, circuit aging related effects, and faults
due to chip manufacturing defects and design bugs [1]. Most failures remain
undetected during post-silicon validation and eventually manifest themselves
during the operation of HPC systems, e.g., in runs of HPC applications, and in
upgrades or maintenance of system software and devices. As process technol-
ogy continues to shrink and HPC systems today tend to operate at low supply
voltage for power efficiency purposes, e.g., near-threshold voltage computing [2],
hardware components of supercomputers become more susceptible to all types
of faults at a greater rate. Therefore, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) of the
system is expected to dramatically decrease for forthcoming exascale supercom-
puters.
Resilience of HPC systems to various types of failures has become a first-
class citizen in building scalable and cost-efficient HPC systems. In general, it
is expensive to detect and correct such failures in large-scale computing systems
in the presence of resilience techniques due to: (a) software costs, e.g., perfor-
mance loss of the applications due to additional resilience code for calculating
checksums/residues and saving checkpoints, and (b) hardware costs, e.g., extra
components needed for modular redundancy like ECC memory and more disk
space for checkpoint storage. Generally, resilience requires different extent of
redundancy at various system levels in both time and space. Numerous studies
have been conducted to improve the efficiency of existing resilience techniques
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for HPC systems. State-of-the-art solutions include Algorithm-Based Fault Tol-
erance (ABFT) [3] and scalable multi-level checkpointing (SCR) [4]. However,
there exists lack of investigation to holistic failure analysis and fine-grained
failure quantification for large-scale computing systems, covering realistic re-
silience scenarios in supercomputers up to date, which is definitely beneficial
to understand failure pattern/layout of operational supercomputers today for
better devising more effective and efficient fault tolerance solutions.
In this paper, we propose to discuss various types of errors and failures from
different architectural levels of supercomputer architectures today, and quan-
tify them into an integrated failure model to summarize overall system failure
rates hierarchically, in different HPC scenarios. The primary contributions of
this paper include: (a) study the quantitative correlation of failure rates among
different components, different failure types, and different system layers of su-
percomputers, under specific overall system failure rate bounds, (b) discuss the
quantitative impacts of system resilience levels (referred to as significance index
in the later text) to overall system failure rates, and (c) formalize the resilience
efficiency of failure-bounded HPC systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces
background knowledge. Section 3 discusses empirical failure models used in this
work, and a holistic quantitative study (a refined failure model included) on
failure-bounded supercomputers is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
related work, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Background
Supercomputers today is an extremely parallel and complex integration of
numerous components, primarily categorized into computing units, network,
storage, and supporting devices, e.g., cooling infrastructure, cables, and power
supply. Figure 1 overviews the hardware architecture of contemporary super-
computers hierarchically (taking the supercomputer Trinity [5] at Los Alamos
National Laboratory for example, which ranks 10th in the latest TOP500 list
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[6]): From top to down, a supercomputer is comprised of a number of cabi-
nets (or racks), denoted as Ncabinet; each cabinet is comprised of a number of
chassis (or blades), denoted as Nchassis; each chassis is comprised of a number
of compute nodes, denoted as Nnode (without loss of generality, we ignore that
there may exist a very small number of head nodes in the system that mostly do
the management work). Finally, each computer node consists of hardware com-
ponents including processors, storage, network, SRAM (on-chip), and DRAM
(off-chip). According to the TOP500 list, top-ranked supercomputers up to date
have hundreds of cabinets, thousands of chassis, and hundreds of thousands of
compute nodes overall. In the figure, we only illustrate component details for
one node (interconnects and other devices between nodes, chassis, and cabinets
are omitted due to space limitation), and assume that all nodes and counter-
part components (e.g., all cables) in the system are homogeneous (and thus have
equivalent susceptibility to failures) to simplify our discussion.
Figure 1: Architectural Overview (Hierarchically) of Contemporary Supercomputers.
Note that in Figure 1, we use simplified terms to demonstrate the node
configuration. Specifically, processors can be CPU and/or accelerators such
as GPU and co-processors, which include functional units and control units.
SRAM (on-chip) refers to registers and caches, and DRAM (off-chip) refers to
main memory. Storage consists of any types of hard disk drives, solid-state
drives, non-volatile memory, and cloud-based storage units. Network can be a
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high-speed interconnect such as InfiniBand.
3. Failure Model
Based on the system architecture shown in Figure 1, we denote the fail-
ure rate of each level of system hierarchy as λsys, λcabinet, λchassis, and λnode
individually.
λsys = λcabinetNcabinet = (λchassisNchassis)Ncabinet = (λnodeNnode)NchassisNcabinet
(1)
As formulated in Equation (1), it is straightforward to calculate the overall
failure rate λsys for an HPC system illustrated in Figure 1 based on the proba-
bility theory. It essentially shows failures are distributed over all available nodes
in the system. We assume there are no idle nodes from each level of hierarchy
when we consider failures, and thus all nodes are probabilistically equivalent for
all types of errors.
λnode = αλsoft ⊕ βλhard (2)
For a compute node in supercomputers as shown above, there are two types of
induced faults by nature: soft errors and hard errors. The former are transient
(e.g., memory bit-flips and logic circuit miscalculation), while the latter are
usually permanent (e.g., node crashes from dysfunctional hardware and system
abort from power outage). We denote the failure rate of soft errors and hard
errors as λsoft and λhard respectively. In Equation (2), we formulate the nodal
failure rate as the integration (⊕) of λsoft and λhard (note that instead the
mathematical addition (+) is not used here, given the different nature between
soft errors and hard errors).
The parameters α and β by λsoft and λhard individually are referred to as
the significance index (SI) of failure rates. For various HPC systems equipped
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with different hardware and software resilient techniques, the SI of λsoft and
λhard varies. In general, SI represents the resilience to failures of a given system,
and it has a negative correlation with failure coverage of the resilient techniques
employed in the system, i.e., the more resilient the system is, the more failures
can be recovered, the less SI value is. Consequently in Equation (2) the nodal
failure rate λnode changes accordingly, with the SI values introduced.
Due to the demanding requirements of system-wise power efficiency and
resilience as the goal of US Department of Energy (DOE) for the upcoming
exascale computers [7], current and future large-scale HPC systems needs to
be not only power-bounded, but also failure-bounded, which means the overall
system failure rate needs to be capped under a threshold value λcapsys, provided a
power budget [8]. For simplicity of discussion, we define⊕ by explicitly summing
up soft and hard error rates. Therefore, based on Equations (1) and (2), we can
reformulate the capped failure rates for soft errors and hard errors, under the
specified expected system failure rate cap λcapsys below:
λcapsys = (αλ
cap
soft + βλ
cap
hard)NnodeNchassisNcabinet (3)
According to the definition of soft errors and hard errors, node-wise we
assume that processors, on-chip SRAM, and off-chip DRAM are the primary
sources of soft errors, and storage and network are the main contributors to
hard errors (in practice power supply contributes to hard errors considerably
as well, which will be covered in the refined failure model in Section 4.3 where
we assume power supply faults occur at chassis and cabinet levels). Without
loss of generality (more components can be incorporated if needed), we look
into the components above within a node, and formulate λsoft and λhard more
specifically as follows:
λsoft = λprocessor + λSRAM + λDRAM (4)
λhard = λstorage + λnetwork (5)
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4. Failure-bounded Quantitative Study
In this section, we conduct exploratory quantitative discussion on several
common scenarios in state-of-the-art HPC systems. With the established fail-
ure models above, our goals include: (a) given acquired failure data of system
components, make some inferences on unknown failure rate caps of other compo-
nents, and (b) speculate the system-/component-wise failure rate ranges under
some known failure rate caps.
4.1. Capping Failures by Types
Per the mechanism of detection and correction, soft errors can be categorized
as Detected and Corrected Errors (DCE), Detected but Uncorrectable Errors
(DUE), and Silent Errors (SE) [9]. Any unmasked SE are referred to as Silent
Data Corruption (SDC), i.e., incorrect program outputs. DCE generally occur
in ECC-protected SRAM/DRAM, and examples of DUE include crashes and
hangs of program execution. We assume that each compute node has statisti-
cally equivalent chances for incurring soft errors and/or hard errors. Moreover,
assume an HPC system where on average 80% of soft errors occurring in a single
node are DCE (masked by ECC memory), 5% are DUE, and 15% are SDC, and
there are no fault tolerance support at the software stack such as Algorithm-
Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT), which means that 20% of the total incurred
soft errors circumvent resilience techniques employed, i.e., α = 0.2. Likewise,
we assume that at the hardware stack, appropriate hardware-based resilience
techniques are employed, and 60% hard errors can be successfully masked, i.e.,
β = 0.4.
Substituting α = 0.2 and β = 0.4 into Equation (3) yields:
λcapsys = (0.2λ
cap
soft + 0.4λ
cap
hard)NnodeNchassisNcabinet (6)
Given that NnodeNchassisNcabinet is a constant number that refers to the
total number of active compute nodes system-wide, and the assumed values for
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α and β, for the three remaining variables in Equation (6), we can easily solve
one provided the other two.
The failure rate λ can be expressed in terms of either Mean Time To Failure
(MTTF) [10] or Failure In Time (FIT) [11]. FIT is inversely proportional to
MTTF and is defined as a failure rate of 1 in a billion hours. Here we adopt FIT
as the calculation unit due to its additive nature, different from MTTF. Existing
studies demonstrate that for HPC architectures nowadays, SRAM failure rates
range from 10 FIT to 100 FIT [12], and DRAM failure rates are of the order of
magnitude of 100 FIT [13]. Therefore, without loss of generality, assume that
there is a supercomputer of 100,000 nodes, with λcapsoft = 200 FIT. Meanwhile,
as a premise, λcapsys cannot exceed 5,000,000 FIT as required for system-level
resilience. With the parameters already known, we can solve λcaphard as below:
λ
cap
hard =
λcapsys
NnodeNchassisNcabinet
− 0.2λcapsoft
0.4
=
5000000
100000 − 0.2× 200
0.4
= 25 (7)
which indicates that in order to achieve λcapsys no greater than 5,000,000 FIT,
given λcapsoft = 200 FIT and the above α and β values, the threshold value of
λ
cap
hard is 25 FIT.
Scenario 1: An HPC System with Higher Resilience to Soft Errors
Figure 2 depicts the system failure rate curve, as nodal soft/hard error rate
changes, provided the hypothesized failure rate SI values α = 0.2 and β = 0.4 in
Equation (3). This scenario represents HPC systems that have higher resilience
to soft errors, compared to hard errors. We can see that although overall λcapsys
is linear to λcapsoft and λ
cap
hard respectively, the system characteristic of higher
resilience to soft errors makes λcapsys be affected more by the variation of λ
cap
hard,
compared to that of λcapsoft. Figure 2 also shows that this trend remains the same
for all λcapsoft and λ
cap
hard values.
Scenario 2: An HPC System with Higher Resilience to Hard Errors
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Figure 2: Overall System Failure Rates of HPC Systems (Scenario 1).
Figure 3 plots the system failure rate curve with another set of configuration
of failure rate SI values α = 0.5 and β = 0.25 in Equation (3), which reflects
HPC system with higher resilience to hard errors instead of soft errors. Likewise,
due to the higher tolerance to hard errors, the curve shows the trend that λcapsys
tend to be impacted more by λcapsoft instead of λ
cap
hard, i.e., with the same amount
of change between λcapsoft and λ
cap
hard, λ
cap
sys varies greater with the change of λ
cap
soft,
as shown in Figure 3.
4.2. Capping Failures by Components
Instead of capping failure rates of soft/hard errors at system level, HPC sys-
tems today also have resilience requirements for specific components. Given the
system-wise failure cap and some acquired failure data from other components,
we can obtain the capped failure rates for the interested components.
Substituting Equations (4) and (5) into Equation (3) yields:
λcapsys =
(
α(λcapprocessor+λ
cap
SRAM+λ
cap
DRAM )+β(λ
cap
storage+λ
cap
network)
)
NnodeNchassisNcabinet
(8)
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Figure 3: Overall System Failure Rates of HPC Systems (Scenario 2).
Likewise, NnodeNchassisNcabinet is a constant number. We employ the same
hypothesized failure rate SI values as Scenario 1, α = 0.2 and β = 0.4, and
the same premise of an HPC system of 100,000 nodes with λcapsys = 5,000,000
FIT. In addition, we assume that from system logs historically, failure data of
processor, SRAM, and network are acquired as follows: λprocessor = 90 FIT,
λSRAM = 70 FIT, and λnetwork = 20 FIT. Substituting all known parameters
into Equation (8), we have:
0.2(90 + 70 + λcapDRAM ) + 0.4(λ
cap
storage + 20) = 50
32 + 0.2λcapDRAM + 0.4λ
cap
storage + 8 = 50
λ
cap
DRAM + 2λ
cap
storage = 50 (9)
which indicates that in order to preserve the assumed failure rates, the quanti-
tative relationship between λcapDRAM and λ
cap
storage in (9) must be satisfied.
4.3. Refining Failure Model from System Hierarchy
Although an HPC system is comprised of compute nodes, failures may hap-
pen not only at local nodes, but also interconnects between nodes, power supply
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and other devices at chassis or cabinet level. When such failures occur at higher
levels rather than at a single node, all nodes at the related levels are affected.
For example, if the power supply at cabinet level fails, all nodes within the af-
fected cabinets will be down. Consider the occurrence of failures hierarchically
at different system layers, we refine the failure models as follows:
λrefsys = α
′λnodeN
total
node + β
′λnodechassisN
total
chassis + γ
′λnodecabinetN
total
cabinet (10)
note that in Equation (10) the parameters λnodechassis and λ
node
cabinet are failure rates
of non-node devices/components at chassis and cabinet levels respectively, the
parameters α′, β′, and γ′ are the SI of node, chassis, and cabinet failure rates
respectively, and the constants N totalnode , N
total
chassis, and N
total
cabinet individually refer
to the total number of nodes, chassis, and cabinets in the system overall. From
previous models, we have:
N totalnode = NnodeNchassisNcabinet
N totalchassis = NchassisNcabinet
N totalcabinet = Ncabinet
Recent studies on DOE supercomputers indicate that failures at system-wide
component level play a significant role in the resilience of the system. From an-
alyzing one-year system logs of the supercomputer Mira at Argonne Leadership
Computer Facility of Argonne National Laboratory, the frequency of fatal events
based on different components and categories has been clearly identified. Ac-
cording to the statistics from this study, although soft errors (mostly memory
errors) at node level are the most frequently occurred failure type, failures on
system-wide components amount to at least 39.47% of all observed failures, as
listed in Table 1 [14]. We can group all off-node failures in terms of λchassis and
λcabinet given the specific location of failures. For simplicity of discussion, fail-
ures occurred between chassis and between cabinets are considered into λchassis
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and λcabinet respectively.
Table 1: Category of Failure Rates by Components of the Supercomputer Mira.
Component Failure Rate Failure Location
(system-wide) (over one year) (on/off node)
compute unit
53.95% on node
(soft error)
card 14.47% off node
cable 8.55% off node
link module 6.58% off node
process/daemon 5.26% off node
coolant monitor 4.61% off node
other 6.58% N/A
In order to study the relationship among the failure rates at node, chassis,
and cabinet level, under a predefined system failure rate cap and with resilience
techniques employed, we consider the following scenario:
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Figure 4: Correlation of Node/Chassis/Cabinet Failure Rates under a System Failure Rate
Cap (Scenario 3).
Scenario 3: An HPC System with Resilience and Capped System Failure Rates
Figure 4 shows the node, chassis, and cabinet failure rate curve for an-
other HPC system scenario, where we assume that the node, chassis, and cab-
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inet failures in this system are tolerated to some extent by employed resilience
techniques individually, and consequently α′ = 0.2, β′ = 0.6, and γ′ = 0.5.
We adopt the same system architectural configuration as previous examples:
100,000 nodes (100 nodes per chassis, 10 chassis per cabinet, and 100 cabinets
in the system), with λcapsys = 5,000,000 FIT. Therefore, Equation (10) is instan-
tiated below:
5000000 = 0.2λnode × 100000 + 0.6λ
node
chassis × 1000 + 0.5λ
node
cabinet × 100
100000 = 400λnode + 12λ
node
chassis + λ
node
cabinet (11)
Specifically, Figure 4 is an illustrated version of Equation (11). We can see
that as λnodechassis and λ
node
cabinet change, the variation of λnode is comparatively
small, i.e., λnodechassis and λ
node
cabinet both range from 0 to 500 FIT, while λnode
ranges only from 230 to 250 FIT. This is because there exist much more nodes
compared to chassis and cabinets in the system overall. However, statistically,
failure rates of a single node are smaller than failure rates of a single chassis
or a single cabinet. In general, with a capped system failure rate, the growing
of failure rates of any hierarchy level (node, chassis, or cabinet), leads to the
decreasing of failure rates of the other two levels. We can also see that the
variation of λnodechassis has a greater impact on the variation of λnode, compared
to the variation of λnodecabinet.
4.4. Failure-bounded HPC System Time Usage and Resilience Efficiency
Regarding the impacts of resilience on HPC systems, the breakdown of sys-
tem time usage by functionality (e.g., system in idle, operation, computation,
or I/O) is highly beneficial since fine-grained efficiency analysis is feasible. Fig-
ure 5 overviews the general time usage of typical HPC systems today [15]. We
can clearly see that the time used for resilience purposes Tr is a part of the
system run time Tu, while the other part is solve time Ts which is in general
application-specific. Without loss of generality, we assume that in Figure 5 the
13
Figure 5: Time Usage Overview of Failure-bounded HPC Systems.
highlighted time components (To, Tp, Tu, Tr, and Ts) account for the majority
of the total system time Tsys. Furthermore, the resilience efficiency of an HPC
system can be formalized as follows:
Eres = E
run
res × E
prod
run × E
oper
prod =
Tr
Tu
×
Tu
Tp
×
Tp
To
=
Tr
To
(12)
Note that in practice, Tu varies depending on if there exist failures or not
in HPC runs. Since if there are no failures during HPC runs, no extra costs
on recovering from failures which makes Tu smaller. Specifically, let the system
employ Checkpoint/Restart (C/R) as the resilience technique. If no hard errors
occur while applications are running, the system does not need to restart from
the last saved checkpoint, and then less time spent on resilience, i.e., smaller Tu
while Ts unchanged. For example, assume that there is an HPC system in opera-
tion of 10,000 hours, where 8,000 hours in applications running without failures,
while 8,400 hours in application running with failures. Without resilience tech-
niques employed, the application total run time is 6,600 hours (which can also
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be estimated using application algorithmic complexity and computation capa-
bility of the system). Using Equation (12), we can easily obtain the resilience
efficiency of both scenarios below:
Eerrres =
8000− 6600
10000
= 14% (13)
Eerrres =
8400− 6600
10000
= 18% (14)
As shown, Eerrres has a greater value than E
err
res , due to the presence of failures
which needs additional resilience time on recovering for correct HPC runs. For
different resilience techniques, the difference between Eerrres and E
err
res may vary,
because of the different nature of recovering from failures.
It is well-studied that supercomputers today (up to petascale) are exposed
to high failure rates due to various root causes, with MTTF ranging from 50
minutes to 230 minutes [16]. Forthcoming exascale supercomputers are expected
to suffer from increased failure rates due to a greater number of components,
with predicted MTTF ranging from 22 minutes to 120 minutes [7]. With the
expected failure rates, we can speculate the resilience efficiency of future exascale
supercomputers using our models. Assume that there is an exascale system
in operation of 10,000 hours, and one failure occurs every 120 minutes, with
40% hard errors and 60% soft errors. The employed resilience techniques can
successfully capture every failure and take 0.7 hour and 0.2 hour to detect and
recover from hard errors and soft errors individually. Using Equation (12), we
calculate the resilience efficiency below:
Eres =
0.7× (0.4× 100002 ) + 0.2× (0.6×
10000
2 )
10000
=
1400 + 600
10000
= 20% (15)
From the calculation shown above, we can see that in order to obtain higher
resilience efficiency for failure-bounded HPC systems in this era, we need to
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develop more cost-effective resilience techniques, or increase the MTTF of future
supercomputers.
5. Related Work
Modeling methods have been extensively used for large-scale computing sys-
tems, for the purposes of failure prediction [17] [18], trade-off optimization [19]
[20], and vulnerability reduction [21] [22]. Gainaru et al. [17] proposed to
characterizing the normal and faulty behavior of HPC systems by using signal
analysis to model the flow of each state event during HPC system lifetime. The
extracted models accurately reflected system outputs and improved the effec-
tiveness of fault prediction. The subsequent work [18] leveraged data mining
techniques to offer an adaptive failure prediction module for accurate fault pre-
diction, and was evaluated on two large-scale systems for prediction precision
and recall impacts. Instead of focusing on analyzing the system state data (re-
ferred to as system events in [17] and [18]), our work investigates failure rate
correlation at different system hierarchical levels and system components levels.
Rafiev et al. [19] studied the interplay between critical dimensions in HPC,
i.e., performance, energy, and reliability using a modeling framework based on
a resource-driven graph representation. The layer-agnostic models applied effi-
ciently to large-scale systems and diverse types of concurrency. Tan et al. [20]
quantitatively modeled the integrated energy efficiency in terms of performance
per Watt and showcased the trade-offs among typical HPC parameters, by ex-
tending the Amdahls Law and the Karp-Flatt Metric. The proposed models
were evaluated to help find the optimal HPC configuration for the highest in-
tegrated energy efficiency with resilience. This work focuses on the resilience
of HPC systems only and our failure model is based on the probability the-
ory. Casas et al. [21] presented an approach that analyzes the vulnerability
of sparse scientific applications to hardware faults at large scales, and reduced
their vulnerability by protecting the most vulnerable components and failure
prediction. Leveraging register vulnerability, Tan et al. [22] investigated the va-
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lidity of failure rates in HPC systems at near-threshold voltage, and empirically
evaluated the power saving opportunities without incurring observable number
of soft errors during HPC runs. Our work differs from them since the proposed
model here is for better understanding failure pattern of operational supercom-
puter architectures today and thus devising more feasible resilience solutions
accordingly.
6. Conclusions
Due to the expansion of HPC systems in size and duration in use, it is criti-
cal to maintain the resilience of supercomputers today. For resilience purposes,
it is beneficial to quantify failures in existing failure-bounded HPC systems in
a fine-grained fashion. In this paper, we conduct an exploratory quantitative
study on holistic failure modeling for contemporary large-scale computing sys-
tems, which also sheds light on understanding potential failures on forthcoming
supercomputers in the exascale era, and helps better devise more feasible re-
silience solutions at scale. Specifically, we integrate different failures from the
perspective of system hierarchy, and summarize the overall system failure rate
formally. We also discuss various scenarios of HPC system resilience categorized
by error types, system components, and hierarchical levels, and formalize the
significance index of failure rates and the resilience efficiency of supercomputers
today under a system failure rate cap.
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